There are two main forms of peaceful protest - planned actions, which presuppose an agreed set of goals between the different forces in the United Front, and snap actions that can occur during a planned protest or in response to an immediate crisis.

Snap actions must have an identified political opportunity or else they become diversions and take people away from the main protest. An example of a successful snap action was during the Richmond SC occupation when supporters went to the Education Department in Melbourne demanding a meeting in response to losing an Equal Opportunity Case. It was an attempt to turn defeat into victory. The police and private security over-reacted before the TV cameras and a propaganda victory was won.

The propaganda (leaflets, posters, web pages etc) will reflect the political agreement within the United Front in preparation for the action. Within the group, different parties and groups can still bring out their own propaganda for the action. The propaganda should be concrete eg "Save this School", "Reinstate Mr X". The demands are therefore winnable and can bring people into struggle. Socialists will then have a wider audience for the broader issues they raise.

Too abstract, too broad, too multi-issue propaganda is dangerous. It is easier for the ruling class, and especially the Labor Party, to agree to "End Poverty" or "Support Free Education" than to support a concrete, real demand of workers in motion such as save a particular school from closure, reinstate a particular group of workers etc.

It is in the fight for these concrete reforms that workers come into conflict with the state, the mass media, the labour movement bureaucracy and thereby become more open to socialist ideas.

As Peter Camejo outlined in a 1970 speech to the US SWP, "we advocate many things, but we try to put into practise those things the masses are prepared for. We advocate general strikes, but we don't call them, because we're not fools. We know there cannot be a general strike, on any issue right now, given the present level of consciousness. And you won't get to the point where there can be general strikes unless you put people in motion, precisely because when they start to move on one issueSpeople begin to question the whole society and to see the interrelationship between the different issues. In fact, it is the way people radicalise."

Drawing together as much information in advance is key. Knowledge of the geography of the protest area and possible police movements are key to ensuring the ability for quick tactic shifts in plan on the day, if necessary. The Richmond SC occupation had been forewarned by leaks in the opponent's camp of a raid on the school, which helped tremendously in planning. At S11 information from Crown staff has useful to the campaign on the first day of the protest.

The SP usually supports police liaison before an event, but always with two or more protestors in attendance. Such meetings often give us some idea of police plans for the day. A meeting with the police before the trial of Nazi leader Michael Brander allowed Militant (now SP) to hear of police plans for the placement of the Nazi and anti-Nazi supporters outside the County Court and allowed us to successfully push for us to get the higher ground.

No agreements should be entered into in these mee ings-that's the job of the broader campaign body. Campaign police liaison representatives should be elected. They should have the mobile numbers for their equivalent in the police. On secondary issues, this can be useful. For example, on the Sunday night before S11, protest police liaison representative were able to pressurise police to turn off water sprinklers that had turned on at 11pm and were in danger of wrecking our first aid equipment.

A good PA system and if necessary a stage is key. This allows campaign representatives to inform the protestors of latest developments, it allows for entertainment, and most importantly provides a political space for the campaign. It is key that this equipment is not hijacked by one component part of the campaign, but allows space for all ideas, within the context of the agreed goals of the United Front.

First Aid equipment is essential, even on the smallest of rallies. The police can sometimes block emergency professionals and non-government first aid may have a political bias against the protest (eg St Johns at S11). Often protestors can negotiate access and egress through police lines for first aiders-which can prove useful information for the campaign. All injuries should not only be treated but also recorded in an incident book, with a copy to legal support.

Marshals should be elected in advance so they have the confidence of the group. They should reflect the diversity of the campaign. Their role is to induct rally attendees into the organisational tasks for the action, and also play a basic political role in going over the main demands of the action. They should play a leading role on pickets and on the edges of rallies to provide direction and information to the demonstrators. They should ensure no one is unintentionally isolated and open to arrest.

The campaign should provide the marshals with clear identifying clothing (T-shirt or at least an armband). On long events, marshals should have strictly limited periods of duty to ensure they are alert. To do the job properly marshals need mobile phones or walkie-talkies and/or megaphones linked to a central marshal or marshals situated in a safe position. Mobiles can be scambled or, more mundanely, batteries can run out. A big event requires radio communications as used by the S11 campaign and on the docks in Melbourne during the MUA dispute.

The state has made it practise to arrest protestors on demonstrations, even if they know a subsequent court case will be thrown out. The goal is to take militants out of action, and disorganise a protest. The presence of clearly identified legal support is useful in making police command aware that the action is well organised and will counter-attack legal as well as politically and industrially to any assault.

Legal support allows for the on-the-spot documentation of arrests and assaults, bail information and so on. The presence of camera and video operators, independent of the mass media, allows for recording of police brutality, all arrests, and video interviews at key times. Independent video footage was used in the victorious trial of the Richmond 8, while getting footage of the baton charge off commercial TV was like pulling teeth out. Campaign footage should not be sold to the mass media without campaign approval and never given to the police.

The tendency is for all protestors to want to be on the picket line or blockade point. Unlike the police, we therefore have no ready reserve to strengthen weak spots when necessary. Army and police training manuals make no such mistakes. At S11, the police studied the deployment of protestors and then used regular diversions to confuse, demoralise and disperse blockaders. At a set moment, they would then attack a particular blockade point. Good communications and intelligence information is key to overcome these tactics.

Records should be kept of police movements and shift changes. Information should only be accepted when it is first hand. Even more important is, if at all possible, the use of reserves of protestors. At the MUA dispute on the Melbourne docks, the main gate was staffed not only by picketers but also a ready reserve of people resting or enjoying the entertainment. Good communications meant this group of people could be redeployed to weak spots as required. When the police made their main move against the picket, they blocked the pickets and this ready reserve at this gate, to allow other police to attack another picket without fear of picket reinforcements. This plan was defeated when the CFMEU mobilised a second reserve force (passive reserve) from building workers in the CBD who left work and marched behind the lines of the police blocking force at the main gate, forcing a police surrender.

Long-term occupations are rare and usually the occupiers can enter and leave the building at will. Therefore the organising principals that apply to a long-term picket or blockade would be the same here. The best reference for long term occupations is Behind the Lines, the story of the Richmond SC occupation of 1992-93 (available from SP). Short-term occupations are usually of a siege character (like the RMIT occupation of 1996). Therefore as important as the occuping group inside is a separate but connected support group on the outside, to co-ordinate union and community support, supplies for the occupiers etc.

The youth involved in some of the anti-globalisation protests have shown tremendous courage and determination in the teeth of state repression and harassment. However, not just some anarchist groups but also a small layer of youth have engaged in rioting during the anti-globalisation protests in the US and Europe. The riots are an indication of the desperation of a section of youth that are deeply alienated from capitalist society and 'politics'.

Predicably, the media and governments have enormously exaggerated this aspect of the protests in order to attempt to discredit the movement as a whole. In our material we have to stress the provocative and brutal role of the riot police in these events. (Undoubtedly, agent provocateurs play a role in these events as well). But it is also the duty of Marxists to clearly oppose the counterproductive consequences of rioting, which only plays into the hands of the ruling class and gives the state the excuse to increase repressive measures against protesters and the working class as a whole. Of course, protesters have the right to defend themselves against state repression, but this must be organised democratically.

It is rare for the main strategy of a DA to change midstream, but tactical changes can occur. For example, on the morning of the third day of the S11 protest, the SP comrades argued successfully that a warning should be sent to the police and their backers. If a baton charge was used again, we would maintain our strategy of peaceful protest, but change our tactics-from standing at the gates of the Crown Towers to gridlocking the City by blocking the key roads in the area.

We put this to the police directly and through the media and they backed off from a continuation of the baton charges of the day before. For tactical changes to be made, a democratic decision making process must exist. Such democratic organisation would allow a real discussion on tactics, including how to prepare to marshal and defend the demonstrations and other protests, and also what contingency plans should be adopted including when and how to retreat or change tactics in an orderly fashion, for instance when faced with over whelming force and violence from the police. Tactical options relevant to M1 include occupations of corporate and government facilities, grid locking of key roads, marches, pickets or mass visits to workpaces and campuses to persuade workers to stop work.

The SP is preparing a pamphlet on this issue taking up these questions in much more detail. These discussions will continue in the anti-capitalist movement, in particular around M1. We welcome the input of activists on these questions.